University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2014

Behaviorism in Finance and Securities Law
David A. Skeel Jr.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, American Politics Commons, Banking and Finance Law
Commons, Behavioral Economics Commons, Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons,
Consumer Protection Law Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, Law and
Economics Commons, Political Economy Commons, Public Administration Commons, and the Securities
Law Commons

Repository Citation
Skeel, David A. Jr., "Behaviorism in Finance and Securities Law" (2014). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law.
473.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/473

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

Behaviorism in Finance and Securities Law
David A. Skeel, Jr.

I.

INTRODUCTION

For much of the 1990s and early 2000s, behavioral economics, which studies departures from
rationality in decision making, seemed a lot more fun than classical economic analysis.
Psychologists had identified a fascinating set of anomalies. Most of us value assets—whether
they are coffee mugs, houses, or no doubt private islands—more highly if we already own them
and are considering selling them than if we do not own them and are deciding how much we
would pay for them.1 Israeli parents usually picked up their child on time when the only
punishment was the stigma of violating the norm against late pickup; but tardiness rates shot up
after the daycare center started imposing a small fine on parents who arrived late.2 These and
other biases raised questions about the widespread assumption—which lay at the heart of law
and economics, the dominant scholarly methodology—that individuals tend to act rationally,
consistently and in their own self interest.3

The Achilles heel of behavioral economics was the difficulty of distilling it to a single,
coherent methodology. “To date,” as one legal scholar put it a decade ago, “behavioral
economics has not (and may not ever) develop a single theory that explains or predicts the full
range of human behavior, as rational choice theory claims to do.”4 The absence of a unifying
theory is not a prerequisite for taking behavioralism’s findings seriously, of course, but it did
impede acceptance of the new approach. In part because of its multi-faceted nature, the


S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania. I am grateful to Lauren Willis and to the
participants at the Liberty Fund conference for which this essay was first written for helpful comments.
1
This bias, the endowment effect, is one of the most extensively demonstrated of the behavioral biases. See, for,
example, Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect
and the Coase Theorem, 98 J Pol Econ 1325 (1990).
2
Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J Leg Stud 1 (2000).
3
For a succinct statement of the traditional economic view as it applies to law, see Richard A. Posner, The
Economic Approach to Law, 53 Tex L Rev 757, 761 (1973) (characterizing the economic approach to law as based
on “the assumption that the people involved with the legal system act as rational maximizers of their
satisfactions”).
4
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U Cinn L Rev 1023, 1035 (2000).
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regulatory significance of behavioralism’s findings also was often unclear. If chief executives
tend to be overconfident and many corporate acquisitions are motivated by hubris, does this call
for new corporate regulation or might a regulatory response make matters worse?

These kinds of limitations have sometimes posed insurmountable obstacles for
burgeoning legal movements.5 Not so for behavioral economics. The biases are real, and the
number of behavioralists on law and business faculties continues to grow. In 2008, Richard
Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s book Nudge made the best seller list,6 as did Daniel Kahneman’s
latest book in 2011.7 More importantly, behavioral economics has made dramatic inroads into
the administrative process. From 2009 to 2012, Sunstein was the head of President Obama’s
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. In a widely read memo, he explicitly encouraged
the executive agencies under OIRA oversight to consider behavioral factors when they design
rules.8

In this Essay, I take stock of the behavioral economics movement, focusing in particular
on its interaction with traditional cost-benefit analysis and its implications for agency structure.
The usual strategy for such a project—a strategy that has been used by others with behavioral
economics—is to marshal the existing evidence and critically assess its significance. My
approach in this Essay is somewhat different. Although I describe behavioral economics and
summarize the strongest criticisms of its use, the heart of the Essay is inductive, and focuses on a
particular context: financial and securities regulation. My choice of terrain is not accidental.
Three years ago, Congress completely revamped American financial regulation, changing both
rules and regulatory institutions.9 In some areas, such as the creation of the new Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, behavioral findings featured prominently in the debate prior to
enactment. In others, such as the inclusion of rules designed to prohibit banking regulators from
bailing out large financial institutions, behavioral insights were implicit; and in still others, such
5

Law and literature is the leading recent example. See, for, example, Jane B. Baron, Law, Literature and the
Problems of Interdisciplinarity, 108 Yale L J 1059 (1999) (exploring the absence of a single methodology).
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Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008).
7
Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011).
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.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/disclosure_principles.pdf.”
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as a provision authorizing the Securities and Exchange Commission to facilitate directorial
nominations by minority shareholders, it appears to have been absent altogether. The very
unevenness of the assimilation, together with the richness of the behavioral literature in this
context, makes the new regulatory landscape fertile grounds for exploring the promise and perils
of behavioral economics.

To lay the foundation for the Essay, I begin by briefly describing behavioral economics
and by surveying the most significant critiques of its use. I then turn to the heart of the Essay, a
consideration of how behavioral economics has informed, or might inform, the work of the
Consumer Bureau; SEC rulemaking on proxy access; and our assessment of the efforts of the
new financial legislation to ban bailouts. I conclude, among other things, that behaviorism’s
relevance is quite different for rules and rules making, on the one hand, and regulatory structure,
on the other. Although I write from outside the behavioral economics tradition, my hope is that
even behavioralists will find the analysis to be of some interest— if only to spur them to look
more closely at the a few of the issues raised in this Essay.
II.

WHAT IS BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS?

The label of this new economic methodology that revels in anomalies is itself anomalous.
“Behavioral” seems to imply that behavioral economics is concerned with behavior, while
traditional economic analysis isn’t. But this distinction does not hold, even as a rough
approximation: traditional economics is of course preoccupied with behavior. The elegant but
misleading label honors the spirit of behavioralism’s founding fathers, Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky, who called their evidence that emotion and incomplete rationality distort human
decision making “Prospect Theory.” When questioned by a scholar who “began to wonder why
its name bore no resemblance to its subject matter,” Kahneman said, “’We just wanted a name
that people would notice and remember.’”10

Perhaps the best yardstick for distinguishing traditional and behavioral economics is
expected utility. Traditional economics assumes that an individual’s decision making can be

10

Peter L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk 270 (1996) (recounting conversation with
Kahneman).
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predicted by a standard utility function. “Expected utility theory assumes that preferences are
defined over consequences rather than over changes from some reference point,” as a recent
survey article puts it, “and that changes in the probability of a consequence are treated
linearly.”11 Behavioral economists study behavior that appears to deviate from this baseline. A
rational consumer would carefully monitor her credit card use and would avoid cards that impose
high fees for missed payments or for exceeding her credit availability if either of these is likely
to be an issue. If consumers are subject to hyperbolic discounting, on the other hand, they may
underestimate future costs, focusing far more on the current benefits of their credit card use.12

In the past several years, the Office of Management and Budget has explicitly called for a
greater consideration of behavioral findings. According to a 2009 report, “[s]uch approaches,
rooted in several decades of work in social science, can serve to improve rules by incorporating
insights that come from relaxing assumptions usually invoked in neoclassical economic theory.
With an accurate understanding of human behavior,” the report concludes, “agencies would be in
a position to suggest innovative, effective, and low-cost methods of achieving regulatory
goals.”13 The following year, OIRA head Cass Sunstein encouraged regulators to consider the
behavioral implications of different default rules, as well as the possibility of an “active
choosing” approach-- that is, requiring people to make a choice, if regulators are unsure which
default rule would be best.14

These initial efforts are both groundbreaking and tentative. A trio of environmental law
scholars have recently offered a much more elaborate framework for integrating “extra-rational”
behavior into the administrative process, hinting at where the behavioral turn may be headed.15
Under their approach, regulators would use a two step process, first considering the monetary
effect of a potential regulation—the traditional focus of cost benefit analysis—and then
11

Lisa A. Robinson & James K. Hammitt, Behavioral Economics and Regulatory Analysis, Risk Analysis 1, 3 (2011).
See, for, example, Oren Bar‐Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW U L REV 1377, 1401 (2004).
13
Office of Mgmt & Budget, Excec Office of the President, 2009 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of
Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on Stat, Local , and Tribal Entities 35 (2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/legislative_reports/2009_final_BC_Report_01272010.
pdf.
14
Sunstein Memo at 10‐12 (cited at note 8).
15
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Amanda R. Carrico, and Lisa Schultz Bressman, Regulation in the Behavioral Era, 95
Minn. L. Rev 716 (2011).
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exploring its “social outcomes,” such as people’s desire for “social status within valued social
groups and social inclusion,” and their desire “to avoid social sanctions.”16 Although the second
step is taken most directly from behavioral economics, the authors propose that regulators
consider behavioral factors in both steps. The assessment of monetary outcomes in the first step
would include considerations such as hyperbolic discounting, people’s tendency to overweight
the “cognitive costs” of assessing options, and the effects of framing on the decisions people
make.17 In their assessment of social outcomes in the second step, regulators would consider
both rational factors such as inadequate information, and extra-rational influences such as
framing and the effects of cognitive dissonance.18
III.

POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO THE BEHAVIORAL TURN

Both the Sunstein memo and the far more fully worked out Vandenbergh et al framework invite
regulators to consider aspects of decision making that go beyond the assumptions of classical
economics. As noted by the OMB report, the potential upsides of incorporating behavioral
insights into the administrative process are enormous. But the behavioral revolution is likely to
be fiercely contested as it moves from laboratories and the best seller lists to the administrative
process. In this part, I briefly outline five possible objections to the behavioral economics
revolution. In the parts that follow, I consider the strengths and weaknesses of behavioral
economics for three different facets of the new financial architecture.

Merton Miller famously dismissed behavioral economics as “a lot of so-called anomalies
in search of a theory.”19 Miller’s aphorism captures a common objection to behavioral
economics. Unlike with classical economics, which offers a simple model of human behavior as
self-interestedly rational, behavioral economics has identified a wide range of decision making
biases that do not always fit neatly together. Even if these findings can be reconciled with one
another, they are difficult to distill to a straightforward model of human behavior. They come
off as a series of qualifications linked by “and.” “Despite efforts at categorization,” as two

16

Id at 723.
Id at 745‐49.
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Id at 749‐60.
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Miller is quoted to this effect in Forbes, available at
http://www.forbes.com/global/2000/0612/0312068a_print.html.
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skeptics put it, “no underlying theory behind why we operate under biases has emerged.”20
Although Vandenbergh, Carrico and Bressman nicely address this concern by singling out
particular biases, their framework does not reduce to a single theory or purport to exclude biases
other than those they include.

Miller’s aphorism also implies a second objection. His sarcastic adjective “so-called”
suggests many of the anomalies may dissolve on inspection. It is hard to imagine a critic
claiming that decision making is never distorted by biases. Although behavioral economists
have often relied on experiments with students, which is not always the most reliable source of
evidence, some distortions are well-documented outside of the laboratory. The sensitivity of
employees’ retirement fund choices to the default setting, for instance, which features
prominently in Nudge, has been demonstrated by evidence of actual financial decisions rather
than surveys or students.21 But some behavior that appears to reflect behavioral biases may
actually be rational. A good recent illustration is the proliferation of exotic mortgages during
the real estate bubble. While the surge in complex, adjustable rate mortgages that consumers
could not plausibly honor if rates rose seems irrational now, it may not have been as irrational,
at least for some mortgage holders, in an environment in which the Federal Reserve had
committed to keep interest at historically low rates and many of the consumers would not have
qualified for an ordinary mortgage.22 Similarly, earlier studies have suggested that consumers’
willingness to assign all of their household assets as collateral for a loan may not be irrational, as
is often thought, but may be a powerful commitment device.23

According to a third objection, even if decision making biases are widespread, markets
will cause institutions to correct for them, thus making regulatory intervention unnecessary.
Lenders’ handling of troubled loans nicely illustrates one form of “cognitive repair.” If a
borrower has difficulty repaying a loan, banks and other lenders routinely move from the loan

20

Stephen J. Choi and A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 Stan L Rev 1, 10 (2003).
Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge at 105‐119 (cited at note 6) (describing suboptimal retirement savings decisions
and studies showing the effect of the default option).
22
As Jason Johnston pointed out at a University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law conference at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School in November, 2011..
23
Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89 Col L Rev 730 (1989).
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department to a workout group, rather than leaving the original loan officer in charge.24 This
separation of responsibilities corrects for the possibility that a loan officer who was enthusiastic
enough about the borrower to authorize the initial loan may not be able to objectively assess
whether the debtor can repay. Markets also may counteract decision making biases more
directly. If a financial institution tries to take advantage of decision making biases, it may be
underpriced by competitors.25 If markets are competitive and corrections widespread, decision
making biases may be less important in practice than they at first appear. If markets are
segmented or subject to cross subsidies, on the other hand, they may not counteract consumer
biases.

A fourth objection argues that even if decision making biases are common and often are
not corrected by market adjustments, regulation may not be an effective response. After all, the
reasoning goes, regulators themselves are also subject to biases.26 By itself, the possibility that
regulators’ decision making also is biased does not necessarily counsel against regulatory
intervention. Only if we conclude that regulation will be worse if flawed regulators take the
insights of behavioral economics into account than under existing perspectives (such as the use
of traditional cost benefit analysis) are regulators’ decision making biases a reason to dismiss
behavioral economics. Seen in this light, the flawed regulator objection is really part of a more
general objection about the likely consequences of fully embracing behavioral economics.
According to this fifth objection, widespread reliance on behaviorial economics would indeed
make regulation worse—most likely by inviting excessive regulation. One source of concern is
the different regulatory presumptions wired into neoclassical and behavioral economics.
Neoclassical economics begins with an implicit bias against regulation. Under standard costbenefit analysis, for instance, a regulation is not justified unless it will provide benefits that

24

See, for, example, Robert K. Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics, the Economic Analysis of Bankruptcy Law and
the Pricing of Credit, 51 Vand L Rev 1679 (1998); Chip Heath, Richard Larrick and Joshua Klayman, Cognitive
Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can Compensate for Individual Shortcomings, 20 Res Org Behav 1 (1998).
25
This argument is a close cousin to the argument that uniformed customers will not be taken advantage of in
most markets if a relatively small number of informed customers exist. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde,
Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 Va L
Rev 1387, 1450 (1983).
26
This is a central theme of Choi & Pritchard’s behavioral analysis of the SEC. Choi and Pritchard, 56 Stan L Rev at
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exceed its costs. Behavioral economics starts with the opposite assumption. It assumes that our
decision making is biased, thus implying the need for correction.27

While this by itself might persuade a thorough-going Hayekian that behavioral
economics must be pernicious, for others it only begins the analysis. Why in particular might the
regulatory presumption be problematic? One possibility is that adding behavioral biases to
regulators’ menu of considerations could invite more interest group manipulation than currently
exists. Interest groups are already heavily involved in the administrative process, of course. But
the plethora of potential decision making biases might give interested parties a broader menu of
arguments to seize in their effect to secure self protective legislation. Behavioral economics
might give traditional lenders additional ammunition for campaigns to cripple or ban
nontraditional lenders, for instance, or buttress managers’ efforts to secure protection against
short-sellers. In each of these areas, new, arguably problematic rules might be easier to justify if
behavioral considerations were included than under traditional cost benefit analysis.

Regulators themselves also may behave differently when behavioral considerations are
fully incorporated into the regulatory process. If regulators were convinced that decision making
biases were having untoward effects, they might begin with regulatory nudges, as Thaler and
Sunstein propose, but shift increasingly to “shoves” if the nudges did not produce the desired
result.28 In short, the assumption that decision making is often subject to biases might magnify
the influence of individual interest groups, create a slippery slope to heavy-handed regulatory
interference in the markets, or both.

The five objections (or four, if the fourth objective is collapsed into the fifth) seem to me
the most serious concerns about the behavioral revolution in law. To some extent, I have tested
27

See, for, example, Philip E. Tetlock P Barbara A. Mellers, The Great Rationality Debate, 13 Psychol Sci 94, 97
(2002) ("It should not be surprising that Kahneman and Tversky's research program is more enthusiastically
embraced by economists on the left, who have long doubted that markets are infallibly self‐correcting and
suspected that people sometimes need to be protected from themselves, than by economists on the laissez‐faire
right, who worry about what kind of 'micro' case is not being manufactured for new meddlesome forms of
government intervention.").
28
Thaler and Sunstein are well aware of this objection. They argue in response that concerns about a regulatory
slippery slope should not be a basis for “duck[ing] the question whether [particular] proposals have merit in and of
themselves,” that their proposals do not call for top down regulation, and that in many contexts, “some kind of
nudge is inevitable.” Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge at 240 (cited at note 6).
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each of the objections as I have raised it. It would perhaps be possible to continue in that vein,
and to draw conclusions about the promise and perils of behavioral economics. But I propose to
shift to a more inductive mode, and to explore the implications of behavioral economics for three
key dimensions of the new financial landscape ushered in by the Dodd-Frank Act three years
ago.
IV.

THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU

Because the intellectual case for the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that was created
by the Dodd-Frank Act relied in part on the insights of behavioral economics, it is the obvious
place to start.29 The Consumer Bureau had an unusually well-defined intellectual pedigree: it
can be traced directly to two articles by Elizabeth Warren, a short article in 2007 and a much
more extensive co-authored article the following year. After briefly summarizing the two
articles and the contours of the new bureau, I will attempt to assess several of its most striking
features from the perspective of behavioral economics.

The central motif of the initial article, “Unsafe at Any Rate,” is the contrast between
toasters, which are effectively regulated, and consumer finance, which is not. “It is impossible to
buy a toaster that has a one-in-five chance of bursting into flames and burning down your
house,” Warren begins.30 “But it is possible to refinance an existing home with a mortgage that
has the same one-in-five chance of putting the family out on the street—and the mortgage won’t
even carry a disclosure of that fact to the homeowner. Similarly,” she continues, “it’s impossible
to change the price on a toaster once it has been purchased. But long after the papers have been
signed, it is possible to triple the price of the credit used to finance the purchase of that
appliance.” “Why,” Warren asks, are customers protected when they buy toasters, but not “when
they sign up for routine financial products like mortgages and credit cards?”31

The answer, Warren argued, is that consumer goods are carefully regulated by the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, whereas mortgages and credit cards “are regulated by a
29

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was created by Title X of the Dodd‐Frank Act. It formally
commenced in July 2011, a year after the legislation was signed.
30
Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, Democracy, 8 (Summer 2007).
31
Id.
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tattered patchwork of federal and state laws that have failed to adapt to changing markets.”32
The logical solution, she contended, was to establish a new regulator with the authority to
provide the same kind of protection for mortgages and credit cards that consumers have with
toasters and other appliances. Such an agency “would promote the benefits of free markets by
assuring that consumers can enter credit markets with confidence that the products they purchase
meet minimum safety standards.”33

In the more recent article, Warren and Oren Bar-Gill of New York University surveyed a
wide range of data about credit card use.34 Drawing extensively on the insights of behaviorial
economics, they argued that existing safeguards were not sufficient to protect consumers. The
terms of existing credit card and mortgage contracts exploit consumers’ tendency to
underestimate future costs.35 Neither ex post judicial review nor oversight by existing regulators
could adequately safeguard consumers’ interests.36 Because of their concern for the financial
health of banks, which may benefit from practices that gouge consumers, the Federal Reserve
and other banking regulators face an intractable conflict of interest;37 and the other regulators
with a stake in consumer regulation, such as the Federal Trade Commission, have only limited
authority or are spread too thin.38 To solve this dilemma, they proposed “the creation of a single
federal regulator … that will be put in charge of consumer credit products.”39

Warren got far more of what she called for than anyone would have imagined at the
outset of the debates that led to the Dodd-Frank Act.40 Although the new Consumer Bureau is
technically a bureau of the Federal Reserve, it has extraordinary independence. Most agencies
must ask Congress for funding each year, and are subject to tight political oversight; the

32

Id at 9.
Id at 17.
34
Orin Bar‐Gill and Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U Penn L Rev 1, 26‐56 (2008).
35
See, for, example, id at 49 (“The prevalence of universal default clauses [in credit cards] can be explained, at
least in part, as a strategic response by issuers to this underestimation bias”).
36
Id at 70‐79 (limitations of judicial review); Id at 75‐97 (limitations of current regulators).
37
Id at 86‐95.
38
Id at 95‐95 (FTC).
39
Id at 98‐100.
40
The legislative history, which begins with a lunch Warren had with Lawrence Summers, is described in David
Skeel, The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd‐Frank Act and its (unintended) Consequences 50‐51
(2011).
33
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Consumer Bureau, by contrast, is financed directly (and generously) by the Federal Reserve.41
The Bureau has wide-ranging powers to promulgate consumer protection rules, hold hearings,
and to bring enforcement actions on consumers’ behalf.42 Only if two-thirds of the new
Financial Stability Oversight Council’s members conclude that one of the Consumer Bureau’s
rules poses a threat to financial stability can the rule be overturned.43

To assess the implications of the Consumer Bureau for behavioral economics, it will be
useful to consider three different issues. First, just how essential was behavioral economics to
the case for a new Consumer Bureau? Second, are the Consumer Bureau’s scope and powers
well-designed to deal with the most pressing behavioral concerns? Finally, and most tentatively,
how should behavioral economics figure in the Bureau’s operations going forward?

As we have already seen, the original case for a new consumer regulator was erected on
an extensive behavioral foundation, focusing especially on lenders’ efforts to take advantage of
consumer biases. But the significance of the behavioral contribution is somewhat deceptive.
Sandwiched between seventy pages of behavioral data and a brief overview of the proposed
consumer regulator in the Bar-Gill and Warren article is a careful analysis of the limitations of
existing regulators and rules that sounds much more like traditional economic analysis. The
authors point out the problematic incentives of existing regulators and the weakness of existing
rules, as noted earlier.44 This shift to more traditional analysis suggests a simple thought
experiment. What if the behavioral analysis were simply lopped off? Would the case for a new
consumer regulator disappear? Surely not. A more traditional analysis of consumer finance
would focus on concerns such as consumers’ limited information and the possibility of fraud.
Given these concerns—which echo the arguments that led to the creation of the Securities and
Exchange Commission in the New Deal45—and the debilities of the existing regulators, a strong

41

Dodd‐Frank Act § 1017 (Consumer Bureau entitled to up to 11% of the Fed’s funding in 2012, and 12%
thereafter). Skeel, The New Financial Deal at 107 (cited at note 40) (noting that the funding would amount to an
estimated $500 million in 2011).
42
Skeel, The New Financial Deal at 106‐109 (cited at note 40) (describing Consumer Bureau’s powers).
43
Dodd‐Frank Act § 1023.
44
See note 36 and accompanying text.
45
See, for, example, Rosalie Genova, Building Dodd‐Frank’s New Regulatory Institutions: Lessons from the Case of
the SEC (unpublished manuscript, June 2, 2011) (comparing SEC and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau); see
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case for revamped consumer protection would remain. One could make this case without ever
mentioning terms like hyperbolic discounting.

This does not mean that the behavioral economics is irrelevant, however. The mandate
one envisions for a new consumer regulator will look different if the behavioral evidence is
compelling than if it is not. If consumers systematically underweight the possibility that they
will incur future fees and lenders are not discouraged by competitive markets from taking
advantage of consumers’ vulnerability,46 for instance, one might conclude that the Consumer
Bureau should intervene directly, rather than focusing solely on disclosure and fraud, the
traditional mandate of analogous consumer champions such as the SEC. I will have more to say
about this below.

As actually enacted, the Consumer Bureau is subject to a handful of limitations that seem
curious at the very least from a behavioral perspective. Car loans are excluded from the
Bureau’s authority.47 In addition, the Bureau is authorized to suggest but not to impose a “plain
vanilla” mortgage option and it is forbidden from imposing interest rate ceilings on consumer
loans.48 The exclusion of car loans was a tribute to old fashioned interest group politics: the auto
industry persuaded lawmakers to protect them from new oversight by excluding them from the
new bureau’s remit. If consolidating consumer regulation in a single regulator like the
Consumer Bureau was a good idea, the auto loan exclusion cannot be explained in any other
terms. The most one might say is that the loss is not great from a behavioral perspective.49
Although disclosure and fraud are both concerns with auto loans, car loans do not seem to be as
central to the behavioralist case for the new Consumer Bureau case as credit cards and
mortgages.
also Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 Va L
Rev 1025, 1026 (2009) (noting SEC’s emphasis on protecting retail investors at its founding).
46
As Bar‐Gill and Warren argue. See Bar‐Gill & Warren, 157 U Penn L Rev at 49 (cite at note 34) (consumer
underestimation of future costs); see also id at 21‐22 (failure of market to correct with respect to uninformed
consumers).
47
Dodd‐Frank Act § 1029.
48
Dodd‐Frank Act § 1032 (authorizing Consumer Bureau to offer, but not to require, model forms); id § 1027(o)
(prohibiting usury limits).
49
The Consumer Bureau has recently suggested that it may seek to regulate car dealer loans indirectly, by policing
any discrimination by the financial institutions that provide funding arranged in part by a car dealer. See
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Bulletin 2‐13‐02 (March 21, 2013).
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The treatment of plain vanilla contracts is more interesting. In the months prior to the
enactment of Dodd-Frank, Warren promoted plain vanilla mortgages as a response to concerns
about mortgage regulation, and she was earlier involved in a private initiative involving credit
cards.50 Under a plain vanilla option, lenders would be required to offer a simple mortgage—
such as a thirty year mortgage with a fixed rate of interest and straightforward terms—along with
their more exotic mortgage options. Disappointed in the failure of the private initiative, Warren
concluded that innovations such as the plain vanilla option needed to be imposed by regulation.51

The plain vanilla option can be defended in either traditional or behavioral economic
terms. A model contract reduces the information asymmetry between lenders and consumers,
the traditional reasoning might go, and makes it easier for consumers to compare options. The
plain vanilla mortgage would serve as the default choice, much as the thirty year mortgage has
done in the past. The behavioral case is somewhat similar, but with important differences. Even
if consumers are fully informed, some behavioral economists might argue, hyperbolic
discounting may prevent them from appreciating the risks of non-vanilla terms.52 For
behavioralists who take this perspective, it is not clear that disclosure alone will solve this
problem, since consumers who discount hyperbolically may underappreciate risks even if the
risks are disclosed in the clearest of terms. Making plain vanilla mortgages mandatory would
solve the hyperbolic discounting problem, but would also impose a serious cost: consumers who
could not qualify for a plain vanilla contract might lose their access to mortgages and credit
cards. From a behavioralist perspective, making plain vanilla the default rule might nicely thread
the needle. If defaults are sticky, consumers who quality might gravitate to the plain vanilla
option, leaving the nontraditional loans for consumers who do not qualify or have other reasons
for choosing an exotic loan.

50

See Jeff Gelles, On the Record: How Pew Trusts Aided Credit Card Reform, Trust Mag (Fall 2010) (recounting
Warren’s efforts to persuade credit card lenders to offer a “clean card”), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/news_room_detail.aspx?id=61901.
51
Id.
52
For skepticism about the ability to counteract behavioral biases through disclosure, see, for, example Lauren E.
Willis, The Financial Education Fallacy, 101 Am Econ Rev 429 (2011); Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial Literacy
Education, 94 Iowa 197 (2008). Bar‐Gill is more sanguine about the benefits of disclosure. See for, example, Oren
Bar‐Gill, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics and Psychology in Consumer Markets (2012).
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Given that plain vanilla terms can be defended in either traditional or behavioral terms,
what does it matter which perspective is used? It matters in two respects. First, the need for a
plain vanilla option is much more pressing if one is persuaded by the behavioralist arguments,
since many behavioralists are more skeptical that the flaws in the market can be addressed by
disclosure and competition.53 Second, if plain vanilla were implemented, and large numbers of
consumers opted for other contracts, behaviorally minded regulators might be more likely to
second guess the choices. They might suspect that lenders are pushing consumers into the
alternative and more lucrative contracts.54

From lenders’ perspective, the principal threat of a plain vanilla requirement would seem
to come from one or both of two places, both of them behavioral. One possibility is that extra
rational factors do influence consumer decision making, and that a plain vanilla requirement
would diminish lenders’ ability to take advantage of this. The other is that regulators believe,
rightly or wrongly, that extra-rational factors are in play, and regulators may be more likely to
question deviations from plain vanilla as a result. In this case, lenders fear that regulators will
intervene and impose costs on them even when the consumer behavior is entirely rational. If this
reasoning is correct, it underscores the risk of translating behavioral conclusions into legislation
unless we are highly confident that behavioral factors are driving the consumer decision making
in question.

Does the constraint on the Consumer Bureau that made its way into the final legislation—
the authorization only to suggest, not to require a plain vanilla contract—remove this risk?
Probably not. Although the Consumer Bureau cannot mandate inclusion, it can promise lenders
that contracts based on a model contract will fully satisfy the Bureau’s disclosure requirements.55
More importantly, the Dodd-Frank Act instructed regulators to promulgate rules for qualified
mortgages and qualified residential mortgages that will be presumed to satisfy the Dodd-Frank
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54
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1403.
55
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Act’s ability-to-pay requirements.56 These rules will function very similarly to a plain vanilla
rule, given the benefits to lenders of qualifying for the safe harbor..

The final key provision is the prohibition on interest rate regulation. Traditional
economists are likely to be comfortable with the ban. Although usury laws are designed to
protect vulnerable consumers, they also can make it harder for their ostensible beneficiaries to
borrow, because creditors may refuse to lend if they cannot charge an interest rate that reflects
the risk of nonpayment. With their paternalistic bent, behaviorists might be expected to chafe at
the ban on intervention. But the case is more problematic than one might suspect. Although
behavioralists worry about the vulnerability of consumers who underestimate future costs, the
most compelling evidence of hyperbolic discounting relates to the fees saddled on consumers for
missing payments57-- the “tricks and traps,” in Elizabeth Warren’s evocative phrase—not the
basic interest rate.58 If fees are the worry, a rate ceiling will not help. Indeed, fees are precisely
the trick that lenders have often used to evade usury regulation in the past.59 It is thus possible
that usury regulation would exacerbate the very problem it was designed to solve. The other
major problem with usury regulation is the nature of the regulation. As exemplified by Thaler
and Sunstein’s advocacy for nudges, many behaviorists prefer that behavioral insights be used to
set default rules, rather than as a basis for top-down regulation. “[W]e libertarian paternalists do
not favor bans,” as Thaler and Sunstein put it, in response to calls for a prohibition of predatory
lending. “Instead, we prefer an improvement in choice architecture that will help people make
better choices and avoid loans that really are predatory.”60 Like a prohibition on predatory
lending, usury regulation is invariably mandatory; it is far more than a nudge and is for that
reason problematic even for many behaviorists.61
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At this point, it is possible to draw a surprising conclusion about the three sets of
restrictions we have considered: although each seems flatly inconsistent with the concerns of
behavioral economics, the extent of the conflict shrinks dramatically on inspection. Car loans
are not at the heart of behavioralists’ concerns about consumer finance; the qualified mortgage
requirements and the Consumer Bureau’s authority to suggest model contracts may function like
a requirement that plain vanilla contracts be offered; and behavioralist support for interest rate
restrictions is thinner than one might initially suspect. The restrictions thus pose only minor
obstacles for a behavioralist vision of consumer protection.

The behaviorist dimension of the Consumer Bureau has grown steadily since its initial
conception. The earliest call for a new regulator did not rely on behavioral insights; the
behavioral dimension was added later, with the Bar-Gill and Warren article. But it has become
central to the Consumer Bureau’s mission. So much so, that the Bureau hired a leading
behaviorist to help with its initial initiatives.62 Nor is the growing focus on behavioral factors
limited to regulators. There is considerable evidence that lenders and consumer goods firms use
(and in some cases have long used) psychological evidence to structure the products and services
they offer.63 The Bureau is likely to provide the broadest and clearest test in American
regulation of the efficacy of behaviorist prescriptions.
V.

PROXY ACCESS

In contrast to its centrality to the debate whether to create the new Consumer Bureau, behavioral
economics has largely been absent from the discussion on proxy access—the proposal to
subsidize shareholder nomination of directorial candidates. The task in this context is therefore
more speculative. But it is not hard to imagine how behavioralism could enter into the proxy
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access debate; indeed, the SEC currently faces a predicament with proxy access that may invite a
behavioral turn.

The proxy issue dates back almost to the founding of the SEC. “[T]he SEC first
considered a rule that would have required issuers to include shareholder-nominated director
candidates in 1942,” as one commentator summarizes.64 “This consideration was part of the
rule-making process that resulted in the adoption of the shareholder proposal rule, now Rule 14a8, rule-making that resulted from the changes to the proxy solicitation process that reduced inperson attendance at shareholder meetings.”65 Pressure to provide a mechanism for including at
least some shareholder nominees for director mounted in the 2000s, and proxy access was given
explicit statutory imprimatur by the Dodd-Frank Act.66 A month after Dodd-Frank’s enactment,
the SEC promulgated a new proxy access rule.67 Under the new rule, a shareholder or group of
shareholders that had held at least 3% of a company’s stock for at least 3 years could nominate
directorial candidates for up to 25% of the board.68

Of particular interest for present purposes is the quick demise of the rule and the reasons
for this premature death. The rule was challenged shortly after its promulgation by the SEC’s
principal nemeses, the Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce, as an arbitrary and
capricious rulemaking in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. In a curt, dismissive
opinion by Judge Ginsburg, the D.C. Circuit agreed, invalidating the rule.69 Although the SEC
“has a ‘statutory obligation to determine as best it can the economic implications of [a] rule,’”
Judge Ginsburg wrote, including its effect on “’efficiency, competition, and capital formation,’”
the SEC failed for the third time in recent memory to carry out its responsibilities.70 “Here the
Commission inconsistently and opportunistically framed the costs and benefits of the rule; failed
adequately to quantify the certain costs or to explain why those costs could not be quantified;
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neglected to support its predictive judgments; contradicted itself; and failed to respond to
substantial problems raised by commentators.”71

As Judge Ginsburg summarized the cost-benefit calculus, the SEC justified the new rule
as reducing costs for shareholders who would otherwise be forced to bear the expense of
nominating directors, and as “mitigat[ing] collective action and free-rider concerns.”72 Although
the SEC acknowledged that companies might incur costs in opposing shareholder nominees, it
made no effort to determine how significant the costs might be. Most interestingly, Judge
Ginsburg chastised the SEC for “rel[ying] upon insufficient empirical data when it concluded
that [the new rule would] improve board performance and increase shareholder value by
facilitating the election of dissident shareholder nominees.”73 Ignoring numerous contrary
studies, the SEC “instead relied exclusively and heavily upon two relatively unpersuasive
studies, one concerning the effect of ‘hybrid boards’ … and the other concerning the effect of
proxy contests in general, upon shareholder value.”74 Judge Ginsburg’s two final criticisms were
that the SEC failed to consider the cost to companies of special interest campaigns by unions or
pension funds whose representatives were unlikely to be elected, and that the SEC’s prediction
as to how many new contests would result was almost entirely speculative.75

Whatever the significance of the D.C. Circuit’s repeated invalidation of SEC rules over
the past decade, a matter that has been subject to considerable speculation, the Business
Roundtable case strongly implies that SEC rulemaking needs to include a careful sifting of the
relevant empirical evidence. Even if it was not so intended, this call may be seen as an invitation
for the SEC to incorporate the findings of behavioral economics. Empirical evidence is, after all,
the very foundation of the behavioral turn. While behavioral economics was peripheral to the
proxy access debate prior to Business Roundtable,76 that now may change.
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Much of the existing behavioral literature on corporate and securities law is concerned
with the biases of individual investors, and thus has little direct relevance to the proxy access
issue.77 Although less well-developed, the behavioral literature on managers and board
dynamics might be a more promising avenue for the SEC to pursue as it builds an empirical case
for a new proxy access rule.78 A well-known study found support for the “hubris” hypothesis
that managers are often overoptimistic about their capacities, and engage in empire-building as a
result.79 Other work, some of it quite early, explores the psychology of board interactions,
including the dangers of group think within a board of directors.80 Although none of these
studies is a precise fit, one can easily imagine applications. If directors are prone to groupthink,
for instance, proxy access may provide a mechanism for injecting alternative perspectives into
the boardroom. Concerns about status quo bias might support proxy access for similar reasons.
In addition to strengthening the SEC’s general case, these studies might also help justify
particular and otherwise puzzling features of a proxy access rule, such as the requirement that
nominating shareholders disavow any attention to take over the firm.81

There are two obvious criticisms of SEC use of behavioral studies in this fashion. The
first is that it seems unnecessary. Traditional economics seems fully capable of explaining the
www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch052009tap.htm (arguing for “state law” approach). Paredes proposed the
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case for and against proxy access. Advocates of proxy access argue that it is necessary to
overcome the collective action problems that prevent shareholders from effectively policing a
firm’s directors.82 Critics of proxy access question the seriousness of shareholders’ collective
action problem, arguing that each firm should be permitted to decide how to handle proxy
access, and/or worry that proxy access could undermine directorial decision making or be
misused.83 Traditional empirical studies—such as the study singled out in Business Roundtable,
which found that corporations underperform after dissident shareholder nominees are elected—
can help to determine whether the case for proxy access is more compelling than the critique.

Superfluity is not a compelling reason to rule behavioral insights out of bounds, of
course. But a second criticism might be: the range of apparent behavioral findings is so broad
that the SEC could find empirical evidence of some kind to support any rule it wished to
promote. This argument is a close parallel to the fatal flaw in “other constituency” statutes that
invite corporate managers to consider the interests of a variety of constituencies—including
employees, creditors and the local community, rather than just shareholders—in deciding how to
respond to a takeover offer.84 The problem with these statutes is that they make it nearly
impossible to second guess the managers’ decision, because any decision can be justified as
desirable for some constituency.85 Similarly, the use of behavioral studies might seem to enable
the SEC to justify any rule it promulgates, thus undermining the oversight envisioned by the
Administrative Procedures Act.
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Although these objections point to serious limitations of behavioral economics in this
context, they would not justify banning the use of its findings altogether. If the phenomenon in
question can be fully explained in terms of traditional economic incentives, behavioral studies
will be less useful, especially if compelling empirical evidence supports the traditional
explanation. Indeed, once again analogizing to other constituency statutes, one can argue that
behavioral findings should be presumptively excluded under these circumstances, and that
regulators should simply use standard cost-benefit analysis. But if traditional rationality
assumptions are more tenuous, behavioral findings can be given greater emphasis in the
regulatory process. This will often be the case in the absence of markets or where market
correctives are impaired in some way.

As the ongoing debate suggests, proxy access is not an issue on which decisive empirical
evidence exists. There may well be room for evidence that corporate boards are subject to
characteristic biases, and that proxy access could help to counteract the biases. Given the
manipulability of behavioral findings, however, this evidence should probably be discounted
unless is backed by realistic data on the potential cost of proxy access, and about its effects on
corporate performance—precisely the concerns that were raised by Judge Ginsburg in the
Business Roundtable case.
VI.

THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S EMERGENCY POWERS

I turn finally to another context in which, as with the Consumer Bureau, Congress sought to
constrain regulators who had been given expansive new power. While vesting banking
regulators with vast authority, the Dodd-Frank Act also prohibits them from bailing out
systemically important financial institutions. The two most explicit of these interventions forbid
the Federal Reserve from providing rescue financing for individual financial institutions,86 and
instruct the FDIC and other financial regulators to liquidate rather preserve any financial
institution they take over under the new resolution powers created by the Dodd-Frank Act.87
Consider how behavioral and traditional economics might assess the anti-bailout
concerns of the new legislation. One prominent behavioral model of governmental oversight
86
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emphasizes the benefits of expertise, but also worries that experts suffer from characteristic
cognitive biases such as overconfidence and as a myopic tendency to ignore other possible
alternatives.88 During the crisis as today, the Federal Reserve was the epitome of a highly expert
regulator. Its staff arguably is the most highly trained of any American agency or regulator. But
the Federal Reserve’s expertise was severely limited in at least one respect. Its economists were
banking and financial institution scholars, with little apparent understanding of bankruptcy, even
though bankruptcy was the principal mechanism for resolving an investment bank’s or a
financial holding company’s financial distress.89 Faced with the choice whether to bail out a
financial institution or to leave it to bankruptcy, they naturally gravitated toward bailouts.90

In behavioral terms, bank regulators’ perspective was thus problematic during the 2008
crisis. This does not necessarily mean that prohibiting bailouts was the ideal response to
regulators’ cognitive biases, however.91 If bailouts are never appropriate, a mandatory
prohibition might make sense, although even here there are potential risks, as discussed below.
But if bailouts are sometimes warranted, a behaviorist would favor correctives to close the gap in
regulators’ expertise.92 Adding bankruptcy experts to the staffs of the Federal Reserve and other
banking regulators (as appears to have been done to some extent after the crisis) might more
directly address the particular problem without removing the bailout option altogether.

A traditional economic account would focus more narrowly on the regulators’ incentives.
In the standard public choice account, regulators have a structural incentive to prefer bailouts
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rather than bankruptcy or other insolvency resolution.93 Even if bailouts are economically
inefficient, the reasoning goes, regulators are more likely to be held responsible for a disastrous
collapse today than for the longterm costs of a bailout.94 The incentive is especially strong if
regulators’ tenure is short, because delaying the day of reckoning may pass the responsibility on
to the regulators’ successors. Should bailouts therefore be banned? Here a traditional economic
account would focus on whether the ban is likely to work. Will it actually prevent undesirable
bailouts? Although the efficacy of Dodd-Frank’s ban is of course untested, many traditional
economists are highly skeptical.

If we compare the two approaches, the behavioral and traditional accounts appear to be
two roads to more or less the same place.95 Both suggest reasons for concern about the stance of
regulators in 2008, but also offer cautions about the Dodd-Frank Act’s attempt to prohibit ad hoc
bailouts. Their principal differences seem to lie primarily in their differing presumptions about
the regulators’ motives. Traditional analysis is generally more skeptical, whereas behaviorism
tends to assume more benign motives.96 Other than this, it is not immediately apparent that
behaviorism offers necessary adjustments to the traditional account.

If we take a broader perspective, however, the potential contributions of a cognitive
perspective are more evident. The reaction of many ordinary Americans to the 2008 bailouts
was highly critical, as captured in complaints that Wall Street was bailed out but Main Street was
not. A behaviorist would suspect that this perception may influence consumer behavior in
measurable ways. A recent study based on an on-line survey of respondents offers evidence that
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it will.97 In one set of questions, subjects were told that they held an underwater mortgage.
Those who also were informed that their bank had been bailed out were considerably more
willing to walk away from an underwater mortgage than those whose bank had not been
rescued.98

This kind of evidence would inform a behaviorist’s analysis of the Dodd-Frank Act’s ban
on bailouts. If the bans are genuinely designed to discourage bailouts, a behaviorist might
conclude that they are desirable (or at the least, defensible), despite the constraints on regulators’
flexibility. If the provisions purport to prohibit bailouts, but clearly will not, on the other hand, a
behaviorist might fear that they will reinforce ordinary Americans’ perception that Wall Street
has been, and will be treated, differently than Main Street. The ban would thus exacerbate
consumers’ cynicism about regulatory priorities.

These psychological effects would not fit comfortably within a traditional cost-benefit
style analysis. To the extent they are included, they are generally treated as exogenous effects.
Thus, a traditional public choice model might predict a shift in the views of the median voter in
response to an economic crisis.99 In behavioral economics, by contrast, the effects are
endogenous to the lawmaking process and can therefore be taken more fully into account. This
kind of evidence may be particularly difficult to incorporate effectively into the administrative
rulemaking process, since it raises the manipulation concerns we saw in the last section, and
considers costs that occur beyond the immediate context of rule itself. But it is evidence that is
clearly relevant to an assessment of the anti-bailout rules.
VII.

LESSONS FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION

My analysis of the behavioral implications of several key components of the new financial
regulatory landscape suggests that it will not be easy to incorporate behavioral economics into
financial and securities regulation effectively. Because the psychological biases identified by
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behaviorists are so varied, they often are difficult to translate into clear policy prescriptions.
Even with respect to exotic mortgages, where the behavioral evidence seems most robust, it is
not always clear whether consumer behavior was distorted by biases or was generally rational.

The seriousness of these complications, and the centrality of behavioral factors, seems to
vary considerably in different contexts, however. In this final section, I will tentatively suggest,
based on the analysis of the preceding sections, that behavioral evidence should be scrutinized
differently depending on the context. I will propose in particular that alternative standards be
used for incorporating behavioral evidence into the rulemaking process, on the one hand, and
assessing the regulatory architecture, on the other.

Rules and rule making are what most scholars have in mind when they debate the
findings of behavioral economics. It is here that the uncertain significance of behavioral findings
seems to figure most strongly. The surge in exotic mortgages in the 2000s may have reflected
either hyperbolic discounting or consumers’ rational response to the extraordinary interest rate
environment, or both. The most obvious dangers of incorporating behavioral findings in this
context are the possibility that regulators will misinterpret consumer behavior and over-regulate
as a result, or, as I speculated with proxy access, that the variety of behavioral findings will make
it harder to scrutinize regulators’ rulemaking.

Given the risk of over-regulation when behavioral findings are incorporated into
rulemaking, it makes sense to begin with a presumption against its use, and in favor of traditional
cost-benefit analysis. The presumption should be weakest with respect to decisions that are
made by individuals and are not subject to market correction due to segmented markets or other
factors, and should be much stronger if market correctives are present. Cost benefit analysis
would thus remain primary, and behavioral economics secondary, in the rule making process.

In the other major context, the regulatory institution itself, there is less need to
subordinate the behavioral findings. As reflected in our discussion of the Federal Reserve,
behaviorism’s bias toward regulation figures much less prominently in this context. To the
contrary, it and traditional economic methodologies such as public choice analysis offer
25

alternative insights as to the best way to structure regulatory institutions; behaviorism tends to
emphasize the importance of properly channeled expertise, while public choice attempts to limit
the distortions of self interested behavior.100 The Dodd-Frank Act makes numerous structural
changes to financial regulators that would lend themselves to analysis in behavioral as well as
traditional terms.

Of particular interest in this regard the creation of a new Financial Stability Oversight
Council (FSOC) to oversee systemic risk.101 Chaired by the Treasury Secretary, FSOC is
comprised of the heads of each of the major financial regulators, as well a member picked by the
president to represent the insurance industry.102 In one respect, behavioralists might applaud the
new FSOC. As part of Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act, which created the FSOC, Congress
established a new Office of Financial Research that could serve as a major new source of
information for the FSOC and other regulators.103 The structure of the FSOC itself, by contrast,
is quite problematic. By relying on existing regulatory heads, the FSOC’s structure may invite
its members to simply defend the stances of their own agencies and without bringing any new
expertise to the table.104 These impediments could have been avoided by vesting authority in a
single new regulator rather than a council of existing regulators.

The distinction between rules and institutions is porous, as such distinctions inevitably
are. Although Dodd-Frank’s anti-bailout provisions could be characterized as “rules,” for
instance, I focused primarily on institutional implications of the provisions as a device for
constraining the Federal Reserve and other financial regulators. Despite the occasional
blurriness of the rules-institutions distinction, the case for treating behavioralism differently in
the two contexts seems compelling, at least in the financial and securities landscape I have
occupied in this Essay.
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